Challenging the two-systems model of mindreading


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Abstract

The two-systems model of mindreading advocated by Ian Apperly and Steve Butterfill seeks to find a middle-ground between full-blown mindreading and either behavior-reading or so-called “sub-mentalizing.” Minimal mindreading is taken to be efficient, automatic and to emerge early in human ontogenetic development. Full-blown mindreading is taken to be flexible, less efficient and to develop later. This chapter raises three challenges for this model. First, it challenges its claim to resolve the developmental puzzle. Secondly, it challenges the claim that the representation of the aspectuality of beliefs falls outside the scope of minimal mindreading. Finally, examination of the contrast between Level-1 and Level-2 visual perspective-taking undermines the sharp dichotomy between automatic and flexible cognitive processes. The alternative picture supported by this chapter is of a single mindreading system
that can be used in ways that are more or less effortful as a result of interacting with other cognitive systems, such as working memory and executive control.

**Introduction**

This chapter is devoted to the two-systems model of mindreading recently advocated by the psychologist Ian Apperly and the philosopher Steve Butterfill. Mindreading or theory-of-mind is the human social cognitive ability to represent the contents and attitudes of the psychological states of either self or others. Philosophers have addressed the topic of mindreading or theory-of-mind for several different special purposes. Theory-of-mind (or folk psychology) has been at the center of *ontological* controversies over the mind-body problem about the fundamental nature of mental states.\(^1\) In the context of responding to the challenges of skepticism, mindreading has also been central to *epistemological* discussions of how one can know that other people have mental states (the problem of other minds), how one can know the contents of one’s own mind (the problem of introspection), and how both kinds of knowledge are related to knowledge of the non-mental world.\(^2\)

Psychologists and cognitive scientists investigate the psychological mechanisms involved in mindreading. To attribute a psychological state to either oneself or another individual is to form a belief (or judgment) about the content and the attitude of one’s own or another’s psychological state. To the extent that an ascribed (or represented) psychological state can itself be construed as a mental representation, a mindreader’s belief or judgment about the content of her own or another’s psychological state can in turn be construed as a mental representation of a mental representation, i.e. as a *meta-representation*. Thus, following Pylyshyn’s (1978) comments on Premack and Woodruff’s (1978) landmark paper

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\(^1\) Cf. Stich and Nichols (2003).

entitled “Does the chimpanzee have a theory of mind?” Leslie (1987; 1988), Sperber (1985; 2000) and others have argued that the human mindreading ability is best construed as a meta-representational capacity whereby one’s own system of internal mental representations “can serve as its own meta-language” (Sperber, 1985, 2000).

Full-blown mindreading is often taken to be an effortful cognitive capacity on the grounds that it rests on meta-representational resources. But on reflection, this assumption may turn out to be a prejudice (cf. section 2). Advocates of the two-systems model argue for the existence of a minimal, fast and efficient mindreading capacity distinct from full-blown mindreading in that it falls short of being meta-representational. This model is interesting and challenging. However, my goal in this chapter is not to praise it but to appraise and even to challenge it. The chapter is divided into six sections. As I explain in the first section, the main purpose of the two-systems model of mindreading is to resolve the cognitive tension between efficiency and flexibility. Secondly, I spell out the basic contrast between the contents of beliefs and registrations: while the representation of the former is supposed to be effortful and to require full-blown mindreading, the representation of the latter is supposed to be achievable by the minimal mindreading system. Thirdly, I describe the fundamental developmental puzzle, whose resolution is one of the main rationales for the two-systems model. Fourthly, I assess the attempted resolution of this puzzle by the two-systems model. In the penultimate section, I address the question whether the aspectuality of beliefs is a “signature limit” of the minimal mindreading system. Finally, I examine the contrast between the putative automaticity of Level-1 visual perspective-taking tasks (which are allegedly performed by the minimal system) and the effortful resolution of Level-2 visual perspective-taking tasks (which allegedly require the flexibility of the full-blown mindreading system).

1. Seeking a middle-ground
Ever since Premack and Woodruff’s (1978) paper, much cognitive scientific and psychological investigation of mindreading of the past forty years or so has been devoted to the four related basic empirical questions:

- to what extent does the meta-representational architecture of mindreading rest on the resources of the human language faculty?
- To what extent is mindreading unique to humans?
- How ubiquitous is mindreading in human adult social cognition?
- To what extent do human children learn to read minds through a cultural process involving language acquisition?

There is presently a lively and unresolved controversy over these four related empirical questions between advocates of what can be called a “cultural constructivist” approach to mindreading and their nativist critics. The former assume and the latter deny that, while the meta-representational architecture of mindreading rests on the human language faculty, mindreading is unique to human adults,\(^3\) it is not ubiquitous in human adult social cognition, and human children learn their mindreading skills through a cultural process involving language acquisition and linguistic transmission.\(^4\)

As Perner and Ruffman (2005, p. 214) have put it on behalf of the cultural constructivist approach, the human mindreading ability “may be constructed in a cultural process tied to language acquisition.” Some philosophical advocates of a so-called “radical enactivist” approach to human social cognition have further argued that non-human animals and pre-linguistic human infants are likely to lack the meta-representational resources necessary for full-blown mindreading on the grounds that they can merely entertain what

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\(^3\) In their (2008) review, Call and Tomasello argued that false-belief understanding is unique to humans. But the recent *Science* paper by Krupenye et al. (2016) provides evidence for false-belief understanding in a variety of great apes.

\(^4\) Heyes and Frith (2014) have recently argued that human children learn to read others’ minds in the same way they learn to read words. Cf. Strickland and Jacob (2015) for a critical discussion.
Hutto (2008) calls “intentional attitudes,” not propositional attitudes, i.e. mental representations with genuine contents. If this were true, then non-human animals and preverbal infants could not, nor perhaps would they need to, use the contents of their own propositional attitudes in order to meta-represent the contents of others’ propositional attitudes. Other philosophers have argued that much human social cognition rests on what they call “second-person primary interactions,” which they take to be independent from mindreading capacities (Gallagher, 2001). Other cognitive scientists have argued that the evidence for mindreading in non-human primates and pre-linguistic infants is best construed as a capacity for either behavior-reading (cf. Penn and Povinelli, 2007) or for sub-mentalizing (cf. Heyes, 2014).5

In a nutshell, advocates of cultural constructivism find it incredible that preverbal infants may have hard-wired meta-representational resources; they assume that human children acquire their mindreading abilities through language-acquisition. From the standpoint of their critics, cultural constructivist approaches to mindreading face two related challenges, the first of which has been put forward by Sperber (2000, p. 120) thus: if “an organism endowed with a rich internal system of conceptual representations” lacked the ability “to use these ‘opaquely’ or metarepresentationally, that is, as iconic representations of other representations,” then the question would arise how she could learn to do so on the basis on her ontogenetic developmental experience. The second related challenge is that unless they could read their caretakers’ minds, it is quite unclear how human infants could learn their native tongue.

5 According to Heyes’s (2014, p. 132) sub-mentalizing approach, humans can solve what seems like mindreading tasks by employing “domain-general cognitive processes that do not involve thinking about mental states but can produce in social contexts behavior that looks as if it is controlled by thinking about mental states.”
Recently, the question has arisen whether there could be a social cognitive mechanism that is the middle-ground between full-blown meta-representational mindreading and either behavior-reading or sub-mentalizing. According to the advocates of the two-systems model of mindreading, there is room for such a middle-ground, which they call minimal mindreading (or minimal theory-of-mind) and which is identical with neither full-blown mindreading nor behavior-reading, let alone sub-mentalizing (cf. Apperly, 2011; Apperly and Butterfill, 2009, Butterfill and Apperly, 2013; Low et al., 2016).

Advocates of the two-systems model take full-blown mindreading to be a uniquely human meta-representational cognitive capacity. They further take it to be effortful (or costly), normative and flexible, to rest on language and to emerge slowly in human ontogenetic development. Finally, they endorse the view that full-blown theory-of-mind enables one to represent not just others’ (or one’s own) psychological states but also one’s own and others’ reasons. This is what Apperly (2011) and Apperly and Butterfill (2009) call “the normative account of mindreading.” By contrast, minimal (i.e. non-meta-representational and non-normative) mindreading is taken to be fast, inflexible, efficient and non-normative: it is taken to emerge earlier than full-blown mindreading in human ontogenetic development, not to depend on language, nor to be uniquely human. Crucially, minimal (or early-developing) mindreading is not supposed to grow into, nor to be superseded by, full-blown mindreading. The two systems are separate and do not speak to each other: the early-developing, fast and efficient system is supposed to persist throughout development into adulthood along side the later-developing system. As a result, one should be able to find evidence of the “signature limits” of the early-developing system in adulthood.

This two-systems model of mindreading is one among several versions of two-systems models of human cognitive architecture that have emerged in recent cognitive science. For example, the two-systems model of human vision rests on the discovery of basic dissociations
between visual perception and visually guided actions (Goodale and Milner, 1995; Jacob and Jeannerod, 2003). Dual models of human reasoning rest on the distinction between intuitive and reflective responses elicited by logical problems (Kahneman, 2003; 2011). Recent work on numerical cognition suggests a dichotomy between core numerical systems and the language-based full-blown capacity to represent integers (Feigenson et al., 2004). More directly related to the study of human social cognition, in the context of his investigation of the role of mental simulation in tasks of mindreading, Goldman (2006) has drawn a distinction between low-level and high-level processes of simulation that reflects the distinction between mirroring (or the activity of mirror neurons) and the imagination. Each of these two-systems models of human cognitive architecture must be judged on its own merits.

What lies at the core of Apperly and Butterfill’s two-systems model of mindreading is the recognition that mindreading is subject to the conflicting cognitive demands of flexibility and efficiency: while a soccer player needs a fast and efficient system that will enable him to deceive a goalkeeper in a split second, a jury or a judge needs a flexible but effortful system that will enable her to reflect over several days, if not months, about a defendant’s motivations and epistemic states (Apperly, 2011; Low and Watts, 2013). Only a cognitive mechanism capable of meta-representing the contents of the defendant’s mental states and of representing his reasons for his actions could achieve what a judge needs. As Apperly (2011, p. 9) puts it, “the difficulty in having one system that is both flexible and efficient is apparent from the high prevalence of ‘two-systems’ accounts in cognition, whereby in a given domain… the contradiction is resolved by having two types of cognitive system that operate in the domain, which make complementary trade-offs between flexibility and efficiency.” As Apperly and Butterfill (2009, p. 264) earlier put it, “our central claim is that early-developing and late-developing systems for belief processing need to make different and complementary trade-offs between flexibility and efficiency” (cf. Figure 1).
2. Why full-blown mindreading is taken to be effortful

Human mindreading underlies the ascription to others of a wide variety of psychological states, including emotions (and other affective states), motivations (e.g. desires and intentions) and epistemic states (perceptions, beliefs, states of knowledge). Much of the experimental developmental investigation of mindreading of the past thirty years or so rests on the fundamental and widespread assumption, since the publication and the discussion of Premack and Woodruff’s (1978) paper, that false-belief understanding is a decisive mark of mindreading. The capacity for false-belief attribution is widely taken to demonstrate one’s understanding that an agent’s (instrumental) action does not depend merely on non-mental features of her environment, but on her mental representation of her environment. This is one of the major reasons why advocates of the two-systems model focus on the representation of the contents of others’ epistemic states.

As Butterfill and Apperly (2014, pp. 606-607) insightfully argue, one might track toxicity, not by representing it as such, but instead by representing another property that is reliably correlated with toxicity, e.g. foul odors. As they focus on the representation of others’ epistemic states, the main relevant question for them is: “What could someone represent that would enable her to track, at least within limits, others’ perceptions, knowledge states and beliefs including false beliefs?” (Ibid., p. 606). What they call “minimal theory-of-mind” involves the representation of belief-like states, “but it does not involve representing beliefs or other propositional attitudes as such” (Ibid., p. 607). However, as they are well aware, it is not likely that one could track the contents of all of another’s beliefs (true or false), including e.g. the contents of others’ beliefs about object identity, without representing them as such. (This is why their penultimate quote in this paragraph contains the clause “at least within limits.”) Advocates of minimal theory-of-mind call such belief-like states registrations. They argue
that by representing the contents of others’ registrations, one can track the contents of restricted range of others’ beliefs, namely beliefs about an object’s location. So the question naturally arises: what makes the contents of registrations really different from the contents of genuine beliefs about an object’s location?

There are four related reasons why representing the contents of others’ beliefs (and propositional attitudes) as such has been taken to be an effortful psychological process by advocates of the two-systems model and others: the meta-representational architecture of full-blown mindreading, the role of reasons in explaining, evaluating and justifying human action, confirmation holism and the aspectuality of propositional attitudes.

I start with the meta-representational architecture of full-blown mindreading. On the face of it, there are two independent reasons why mindreading may seem to be effortful, the first of which is that it does not merely involve an individual’s ability to represent her non-mental environment, but also her higher-order ability to use her own internal representations of the world in order to meta-represent the contents and attitudes of others’ psychological states. However, the fact that the best current scientific characterization of a cognitive capacity exhibits computational or architectural complexity does not ipso facto make the use of this capacity demanding or effortful. For example, although the current scientific characterization of the primate visual system exhibits a complex computational architecture, visual processing is not effortful to primates. Secondly, mindreading would arguably seem effortful to organisms lacking metarepresentational resources, if only such organisms could figure out what it takes e.g. to read another’s mind. Similarly, to us humans who, unlike bats, do not use echolocation for navigational purposes, echolocation seems effortful, which it is not to bats.6 However, there is no obvious reason why mindreading should be any more

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6 We can to a large extent figure out what it takes for bats to navigate through echolocation because we have discovered by scientific methods that this is the way they actually navigate. It is, however, highly unlikely that a creature lacking meta-representational capacities could figure out what it takes either to read another’s mind or to see things.
effortful to a creature endowed with meta-representational resources than processing the visual attributes of visible things should be to a creature endowed with visual capacities.

I now turn to the role of reasons in the explanation and justification of human actions. In their paper devoted to the possibility of mindreading in non-human primates, Premack and Woodruff (1978) identified mindreading (i.e. the imputation of mental states to others) with the possession of a *theory-of-mind* on the joint grounds that the imputed mental states are *unobservable* and that the imputation underlies the *prediction* of others’ behavior.

As philosophers of science have emphasized, however, predicting is not explaining. It is controversial to some extent whether possession of a theory-of-mind (i.e. the capacity to attribute psychological states to others) is necessary for predicting an agent’s instrumental action in all cases (cf. Andrews, 2003; Perner and Roessler, 2010). However, it is much less controversial that the attribution of psychological states to others is necessary for both *explaining* and *evaluating* the success or failure of their actions (Andrews, 2009). Both the explanation and the normative evaluation of an agent’s instrumental action rest on one’s ability to represent her *reasons* for her actions. This has opened the path for Davidson’s (1970) well-known argument for mental anomalism, i.e. the view that psychological explanation inextricably involves the representation of an agent’s *reasons* for her actions, which in turn makes concepts involved in psychological explanation irreducibly normative: “intentional action is action that can be explained in terms of beliefs and desires whose propositional contents rationalize the action (Davidson, 1982, p. 97). This is the source of Apperly’s (2011) view that full-blown mindreading is *normative*. The normativist construal of mindreading reflects the assumption that mindreading is not only necessary but also sufficient for representing an agent’s reasons. While full-blown mindreading is clearly meta-representational, one may resist the idea that it is also intrinsically normative.

For the purpose of predicting an agent’s instrumental action (e.g. retrieving her toy), it
may be necessary and sufficient to represent the contents of her desire and epistemic state, including the content of her false belief if she is mistaken. For example, in order to predict a mistaken agent’s instrumental action, it is sufficient to know where she placed her toy before someone else moved it elsewhere in the agent’s absence. While it is necessary to represent the content of her false belief if she is mistaken, it may not be necessary to assess it as false. However, for the purpose of explaining, justifying, appraising or criticizing an agent’s instrumental action, it is not only necessary to be able to assess a mistaken agent’s belief as false, but also to represent her reasons. An agent’s objective reason for looking for her toy at a location is comprised of her desire for the toy and the fact about the toy’s location. If an agent holds a false belief about the location of her toy, then she will also have a subjective reason not to look for her toy at its actual location, but at some other empty location. If so, then she will fail to find her toy. So her subjective reason will fail to match her objective reason, which is to look for her toy at its actual location. Clearly, one could not represent the difference between a mistaken agent’s subjective reason and her objective reason, let alone either explain the failure or her action or try to convince her that she should revise the content of her belief, unless one had the capacity to assess her false belief as false. In short, the capacity to meta-represent the contents of an agent’s beliefs and desires is a necessary component of the capacity to represent and evaluate the agent’s reasons, but it is far from clear that it is also a sufficient condition.

However, many psychologists are inclined to think that full-blown mindreading is both necessary and sufficient for representing an agent’s reasons, including the distinction between her objective and her subjective reasons, if they diverge. Consider, for example, the evidence reported by Scott et al. (2015) purportedly showing that 17-month-olds understand a thief’s intention to covertly (not overtly) cause someone else to acquire a false belief. Infants first saw one agent (the owner) place her rattling toys (which she preferred) on a tray, while
she threw her non-rattling toys in a trashcan. Then they saw another agent (the thief) attempt to steal the owner’s rattling toy in the owner’s absence and replace it by a non-rattling toy. In one condition, the thief replaced the rattling toy by a visually indistinguishable non-rattling toy. In the other condition, the thief replaced the rattling toy by a visually distinct non-rattling toy. The infants looked reliably longer in the second than in the first condition, suggesting that they understood that the thief’s intention was to covertly cause the owner on her return to falsely believe that what she was seeing on the tray was her rattling toy. Furthermore, these expectations disappeared either if the infants expected the owner to shake the toy on the tray on her return or if she returned before the substitution was completed. Low et al. (2016, p. 187), who advocate the two-systems model, have recently objected to Scott and colleagues that this meta-representational interpretation of their data commits them to the assumption that “infants take the thief to be strikingly inept,” as it would have been more efficient for the thief to “simply pilfer” the toy instead of engaging in an “elaborate deception” that is bound to be “uncovered.” Low and colleagues’ objection in turn reflects the questionable assumption that mindreading is not only necessary but also sufficient to represent and evaluate an agent’s (e.g. a thief’s) reasons.

Thirdly, advocates of the two-systems model of mindreading accept Fodor’s (1983) distinction between modular processes, which are informationally encapsulated, and the central processes underlying belief fixation, which Fodor takes to be isotropic and subject to confirmation holism. While the processes underlying minimal mindreading are taken to be informationally encapsulated, full-blown mindreading is taken to be subject to confirmation holism: if belief fixation is subject to confirmation holism, then a fortiori so is the fixation of beliefs about the contents of others’ beliefs (cf. Apperly, 2011). Some philosophers have further argued that acceptance of confirmation holism makes mindreading “computationally intractable.” For example, Zawidzki (2013) argues for the phylogenetic priority of so-called
“mindshaping” over mindreading on the grounds that confirmation holism makes mindreading computationally intractable.

Now Fodor’s own approach to the fixation of beliefs rests on his assumption that the confirmation of scientific hypotheses is our best model for the process of belief fixation and also on his joint acceptance of Quine’s (1953, 1960) holistic view of scientific confirmation. Quine’s own agenda was to use confirmation holism as a step in his argument for the revisability of logical laws and against the analytic-synthetic distinction. Arguably, confirmation holism makes the process of belief fixation — of either scientific or non-scientific beliefs — puzzling. But on the one hand, the fixation of beliefs about others’ beliefs should be taken to be subject to confirmation holism exactly to the same extent that the fixation of beliefs about any other topic is. On the other hand, confirmation holism has never prevented either scientists or non-scientists to fix their beliefs. Where one philosopher sees the opportunity for *modus ponens*, another may see the opportunity for *modus tollens*: neither Fodor’s assumption that scientific confirmation is our best model for the fixation of beliefs in general nor Quine’s holistic view of scientific confirmation is immune to doubt.

Finally, Frege (1892) famously appealed to the aspectuality of beliefs to resolve one version of his identity puzzle: how could the truth of (1) and (2) fail to entail the truth of (3)?

(1) Marta believes that the evening star is shining.

(2) The evening star = the morning star.

(3) Marta believes that the morning star is shining.

(3) is the output of the replacement of ‘the evening star’ by ‘the morning star’ in (1), licensed by the truth of the identity claim (2). If sentence (1) was an extensional context, then the truth of (1) and (2) would entail the truth of (3). On a *de dicto* reading of (3), the truth of (3) does
not follow from the truth of (1) and (2). But on a de re reading of (3), the truth of (1) and (2) does entail the truth of (3). The fact that on a de dicto reading of (3), the truth of (1) and (2) does not entail the truth of (3) is evidence that sentence (1) is intensional, not extensional. The intensionality of belief report (1) reflects the aspectuality of Marta’s belief that the evening star is shining. It is evidence that the particular way the content of Marta’s belief is being characterized, namely as the belief that the evening star (not the morning star) is shining, matters to the truth of the belief-ascription. In other words, Marta can be a rational person and take two different attitudes with respect to the propositions expressed respectively by “the evening star is shining” and “the morning star is shining”: she may hold the first true and the second false, because the propositions are different. This is Frege’s solution to one of the versions of his puzzle about identity.

The aspectuality of beliefs (and other propositional attitudes) is widely regarded as a reliable sign of the propositional character of their contents. The aspectuality of thoughts and other propositional attitudes is one of the premises used by Davidson (1982) to argue for the thesis that non-human animals cannot think. Understanding the aspectuality of others’ beliefs is correspondingly widely regarded as a demanding psychological task. The aspectuality of beliefs is mirrored by the intensionality (or referential opacity) of linguistic belief reports. The intensionality of (1) exhibited by the de dicto reading of (3) stands in sharp contrast with the representation of Marta’s behavior (behavior-reading) (4), as illustrated by the following pattern of inference:

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7 On its de dicto reading, a belief-ascription aims at capturing the way the believer would express the content of her belief. On its de re reading, a belief-ascription relies on what is common ground between a speaker and his audience without taking into account the believer’s own perspective.

8 On the one hand, Davidson’s thesis seems to lie in the background of Hutto’s (2008) social enactivist claim that infants and non-human animals, who cannot entertain genuine propositional attitudes (because they do not speak a natural language), may nonetheless entertain what he calls “intentional attitudes,” which he takes to “involve a kind of intentional directedness which is not semantically contentful.” Hutto further claims that correct descriptions (or attributions) of relevant instances of intentional directedness, which lack genuine semantic content, are extensional, not intensional. On the other hand, Zawidzki (2013) argues that the holism of belief confirmation that is taken to generate the intractability of mindreading reflects the aspectuality of propositional attitudes.
(4) Marta kicks (touches, kisses, pushes) Bill.
(5) Bill = Bob’s father.
(6) Marta kicks (touches, kisses, pushes) Bob’s father.

The truth of (4) and (5) entails the truth of (6). The way the relata of the kicking-relation (the touching-, kissing- or pushing-relation) are being characterized (as ‘Bill’ or as ‘Bob’s father’) does not matter to the correctness of the representation of the kicking-relation (or any of the other relations).

Advocates of the two-systems model propose that while representing the aspectuality of beliefs requires the flexibility of full-blown mindreading, representing others’ registrations can be achieved by minimal mindreading. They take registration to be a non-aspectual epistemic relation between an agent, an object and a location. On this account, representations of the registration relation are extensional (not intensional), as illustrated by the following pattern of inference:

(7) Marta registers <evening star, sky>
(8) The evening star = the morning star
(9) Marta registers <morning star, sky>

Butterfill and Apperly (2014, p. 622) stipulate that the truth or correctness of (7) and (8) entails the truth or correctness of (9). Thus, the way Marta registers the presence of the evening star in the sky (Marta registers <evening star, sky>) does not matter to the correctness

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9 To the extent that success in so-called Level-2 visual perspective-taking tasks requires understanding the aspectuality of others’ visual epistemic states, advocates of the two-systems model are also committed to the claim that Level-2 visual perspective-taking tasks can only be achieved by the full-blown mindreading system, not by minimal mindreading.
or truth of the representation of the registration relation.

In a nutshell, the basic claim made by advocates of the two-systems model is that the representation of another’s registration (which they construe as the representation of a genuine non-propositional epistemic state) constitutes the middle-ground between the representation of another’s belief as such and behavior-reading. Only the full-blown (i.e. flexible, less efficient, later-developing) mindreading system can represent the aspectual contents of others’ beliefs and can thereby represent the contents of others’ beliefs as such. The minimal (i.e. efficient, inflexible, earlier-developing) mindreading system can track the contents of others’ beliefs, not by representing them as such, but by representing the contents of others’ registrations.

3. The developmental puzzle

Recent experimental developmental investigations of false-belief understanding in human children fall into six broad categories of false-belief tasks, according to whether false-belief understanding is measured by means of an explicit or an implicit test. In most fully explicit tests, participants are directly asked a question by the experimenter. Most implicit or so-called “spontaneous-response” tests use participants’ looking behavior in either the violation-of-expectation or the anticipatory gaze methodology. These experiments involve so-called familiarization (or habituation) trials whose purpose is to generate expectations in participants. Experiments based on the violation-of-expectation further involve test trials that may either be congruent or incongruent with the participants’ expectations and the experimenters measure participants’ looking time in response to respectively congruent and incongruent test trials. In experiments based on anticipatory gaze, the experimenters code the location of participants’ first saccade in anticipation of the agent’s action. Some experiments stand somewhere in between fully explicit and fully implicit measures, as when participants
are encouraged to help a mistaken agent achieve the goal of her instrumental action.

Most recent experimental developmental investigations of false-belief understanding have been devoted to change-of-location false-belief tasks used to probe false-belief understanding about objects’ locations. In such tasks, participants see an agent place some toy in one of two opaque containers. In her absence, the toy’s location is switched. The question is whether participants, who know the toy’s actual location, can represent the content of the agent’s false belief about it. (In so-called low-inhibition tasks, the toy simply disappears so that participants don’t know its location. If so, then their own knowledge of the toy’s location cannot interfere with their representation of the content of the mistaken agent’s false belief.)

Some further experimental investigations of false-belief understanding have been devoted to so-called unexpected-contents false-belief tasks used to probe false-belief understanding about the content of an opaque container on the basis of its misleading external appearance. In such tasks, participants are shown that their expectation about what is inside an opaque box, based on the external appearance of the box, is wrong. For example, they are shown that a smarties box really contains crayons. The question is whether participants can represent either the content of their own previous false belief, or the potential content of another agent’s false belief, about what is inside the box, were this agent confronted to the external appearance of the box. Still other experimental investigations of false-belief understanding have been devoted to false-belief tasks about object-identity used to probe false-belief understanding about the identity of a single object with two aspects, or about the identity of two indistinguishable objects. In short, false-belief tasks about object-identity are widely regarded to probe participants’ understanding of the aspectuality of beliefs.

The recent developmental psychological investigation of mindreading has given rise to discrepant findings, thereby generating a significant empirical puzzle. On the one hand,

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10 Cf. Setoh et al. (2016).
solid evidence shows that not until they are at least 4.5 years old can the majority of human children pass explicit or elicited-response false-belief tasks of various sorts, in which they are directly asked a question. For example, in the famous explicit Sally-Anne task, participants who know the toy’s actual location are asked to predict where Sally (the mistaken agent) is likely to look for her toy or where she thinks her toy is. Most 3-year-olds fail the task and point to the toy’s actual location (Wimmer and Perner, 1983; Baron Cohen et al., 1985; Wellman et al., 2001).

On the other hand, consider Onishi and Baillargeon’s (2005) well-deservedly famous study. In their familiarization trials, 15-month-olds saw an agent that provided behavioral evidence that she was motivated to play with a toy (a water-melon), which she placed into a green opaque box located next to a yellow opaque box. In four different belief-induction trials, the infants saw the toy either move from the green to the yellow box or not, in either the presence or the absence of the agent. Then in the test trials, they saw the agent reach for either the green or the yellow box. Onishi and Baillargeon (2005) found that infants looked reliably longer when the agent reached for the empty location with a true rather than a false belief and when she reached for the correct location with a false rather than a true belief. In a study by Buttelmann et al. (2009), a first experimenter placed her toy in one of two opaque containers and left. In her absence, a second experimenter moved the toy from the first to the other container. The first experimenter returned and tried unsuccessfully to open the container in which she had placed her toy. In the false-belief condition (but not in the true-belief condition in which the first experimenter was present during the toy’s displacement), when they were invited to help the mistaken agent, 18-month-olds opened the container that contained the first experimenter’s toy. Furthermore, Setoh et al. (2016) have recently reported evidence that 2.5-year-olds succeed on an explicit low-inhibition change-of-location false-belief task.

Studies devoted to false-belief understanding about unexpected-contents also exhibit
such a dissociation. Most explicit studies have shown that when asked what they earlier thought or what another would think when first confronted with the appearance of a smarties box, which in fact contains crayons, most 3-year-olds incorrectly answer that they thought, and that someone else would think, that it contains crayons (cf. Perner et al., 1987; Gopnik and Astington, 1988). However, two studies have recently shown that younger children can represent the contents of others’ false-beliefs about unexpected-contents. For example, He et al. (2011) have reported evidence based on the violation-of-expectation paradigm that 2.5-year-olds look reliably longer when an agent reaches either for crayons in a cheerios box or for cheerios in a crayon box, after the contents of the boxes have been switched in the agent’s absence, but not if the agent was present. In a study based on the helping paradigm, Buttelmann et al. (2014) familiarized 18-month-olds with boxes for blocks that contained blocks. When they subsequently saw an experimenter unsuccessfully reach for a box for blocks which they knew to contain spoons, infants based their choice of whether to helpfully give a spoon or a block to the experimenter on whether she had a true or a false belief about what was inside the block box.

In short, recent research yields discrepant developmental findings. The basic developmental puzzle is: why do 3-year-olds fail explicit change-of-location or unexpected-contents false-belief tasks if toddlers or even preverbal infants can represent the contents of others’ false beliefs about either an object’s location or unexpected-contents? Until recently, there were two main responses to this developmental puzzle. Advocates of cultural constructivist approaches to mindreading, who assume that only success on explicit false-belief tasks could be evidence of false-belief understanding, argue that preverbal infants cannot understand the contents of others’ false beliefs. Their task is to offer low-level deflationary, entirely non-mentalistic, accounts of infants’ data consistent with their assumption that infants are unable to represent the contents of others’ false beliefs. Some have
argued for low-level associationist accounts (e.g. Perner and Ruffman, 2005); others for behavior-reading heuristics (Ibid.); others for sub-mentalizing processes involving in particular perceptual novelty and retroactive interference (Heyes, 2014).11

Critics of cultural constructivism subscribe to a nativist view of mindreading; their burden is to explain why explicit change-of-location false-belief tasks are so challenging for most human children until they are 4.5 years old. Advocates of the processing-load account (Baillargeon et al., 2010) have argued that success in explicit tasks rests on three separable processes: (i) the representation of the content of the agent’s false belief; (ii) a response-selection process whereby participants understand the relevance of the agent’s false belief to the question asked; and (iii) a response-inhibition process whereby participants must inhibit any prepotent tendency to answer the test question based on their own knowledge of the toy’s location (Baillargeon et al., 2010; Carruthers, 2013). They argue that until they are 4.5-year-old, most children are overwhelmed by the demands of these three processes: in particular, they are taken to lack the executive resources required for achieving (iii) the response-inhibition process.

More recently, some critics of the cultural constructivist approach have also argued for a pragmatic approach to the developmental puzzle, according to which young children fail explicit false-belief tasks, not because they cannot represent the content of the agent’s false belief, but because the question asked by the experimenter is pragmatically misleading (cf. Helming et al., 2014; 2016; Westra, 2016a; Westra and Carruthers, 2017). What lies at the root of the pragmatic approach to the puzzle is the fact that knowing where a mistaken agent placed her toy is sufficient either for predicting where she will look for it or for knowing where she thinks her toy is. However, as stressed by Helming et al. (2014; 2016), in explicit false-belief tasks, participants are confronted with two separate actions: the instrumental

11 Cf. Carruthers (2013), Helming et al. (2016) and Jacob (in press) for detailed criticisms.
action performed by a mistaken agent and the communicative action performed by the experimenter. Helming and colleagues further argue that while success on explicit tasks requires participants to take a third-person perspective on the mistaken agent’s instrumental action and a second-person perspective on the experimenter’s communicative action, young children may be overwhelmed by this perspectival conflict. Moreover, in classical scenarios of explicit change-of-location false-belief tasks, participants are further provided by the experimenter with much irrelevant information about the location of the object sought by the mistaken agent.

While the information about the actual location of the object (provided by the experimenter in explicit tasks) is strictly speaking irrelevant to predicting where the agent will look for her toy, it is nonetheless relevant to the normative evaluation of the agent’s failure to achieve the goal of her instrumental action, which is to satisfy her desire to find her toy. If so, then as suggested in recent papers by Perner and Roessler (2010; 2012) and Roessler and Perner (2013), the proper normative evaluation of the agent’s failure to achieve her goal may require the normative distinction between an agent’s objective reason and her subjective reason for her action. The mistaken agent has an objective reason to look for her toy at its actual location. But given her false belief about the toy’s location, she has a subjective reason to look for it at the empty location. Not until they are comfortable with this normative distinction are young children likely to succeed on explicit false-belief tasks about object’s location. One interesting point of contention is whether, as Perner and Roessler (2012) and Roessler and Perner (2013) have argued, it is the job of the mindreading capacity alone, not merely to accurately represent the contents and attitudes of others’ mental states, but also to represent the normative distinction between an agent’s objective reason and her subjective reason.
4. Can the two-systems model resolve the developmental puzzle?

It is one of the fundamental motivations of the two-systems model to offer a novel *middle-ground* solution to this developmental puzzle that is different from both the cultural constructivist and the nativist approaches (cf. Apperly, 2011; Apperly and Butterfill, 2009; Butterfill and Apperly, 2014; Low et al., 2016). According to advocates of cultural constructivism, only explicit, not implicit, change-of-location false-belief tasks can genuinely probe false-belief understanding. Nativists argue that the data based on implicit false-belief tasks show false-belief understanding in preverbal infants. The two-systems model middle-ground approach to the developmental puzzle rests on the basic assumption that while the early-developing efficient and inflexible system of mindreading enables preverbal infants to represent others’ true and false registrations, only the more flexible later-developing system enables human adults and older children to represent the aspectuality of beliefs *as such*.

According to the two-systems model, the early-developing efficient minimal mindreading system enables infants to represent the contents of others’ false registrations about objects’ locations, which explains the infants’ data, based on implicit tasks. But only when the later-developing more flexible full-blown mindreading system is in place can most 4.5 year-olds pass explicit change-of-location false-belief tasks, which explains why most 3-year-olds fail explicit change-of-location false-belief tasks.

To the extent that registration is construed as a ternary relation between an agent, an object and the object’s location, the content of an agent’s registration seems to be the relational (non-propositional) counterpart to the propositional content of an agent’s belief about an object’s location. If so, then the ability to represent the relational content of an agent’s registration seems to be the *minimal* counterpart to the ability to represent the propositional content of an agent’s belief about an object’s location.

In a nutshell, a minimal mindreader can represent the contents of others’ registrations,
not the contents of others’ genuine beliefs (even about an object’s location). Thus, minimal mindreading purports to stand as a tentative middle-ground between the nativist and the cultural constructivist approaches to the ontogenetic development of mindreading capacities in humans. Whether minimal mindreading does indeed constitute a stable middle-ground position is an open and delicate question. Unlike advocates of the nativist approach, the two-systems model denies that the capacity to represent the contents of others’ beliefs as such is present in human infancy (and could thereby be innate). On the two-systems model, only the capacity to represent the contents of others’ registrations is present in human infancy (and could thereby be innate). On this model, children presumably bootstrap their way to full-blown mindreading on the basis of minimal mindreading and language-acquisition. However, it is a delicate issue whether and to what extent minimal mindreading is a genuine alternative to such versions of cultural constructivist approaches to infant mindreading as behavior reading, associationism and sub-mentalizing. Arguably, an agent’s registration of an object at a location should be confused neither with the agent’s behavior strictly speaking nor with perceptible features of the agent’s non-mental environment, in accordance with the perceptual novelty approach recommended by advocates of the sub-mentalizing approach. However, to the extent that an agent’s registration of an object at a location is construed as an *extensional* non-mentalistic relation, it suspiciously looks like a ternary association between an agent, an object and a location.

In short, the two-systems model rests on the split between epistemic states that have and epistemic states that do not have minimal counterparts: beliefs about an object’s location do, but beliefs about object-identity do not, have minimal counterparts. Minimal mindreaders can track the contents of others’ true and false epistemic states about objects’ *locations* without representing them as such; but they can’t track the contents of others’ true and false
epistemic states about object-identity without representing them as such. Can minimal mindreaders also track the contents of others’ true and false epistemic states about unexpected-contents without representing them as such? It is unclear how the two-systems model should answer this question.

I now want to argue that the two-systems model faces three basic challenges. First, the notion of registration fails to meet a condition of adequacy that is built into the two-systems model. Secondly, I want to suggest that the two-systems model does not really resolve the developmental puzzle. Finally, I want to argue that registration might not be sufficient for handling the basic findings about infants based on implicit change-of-location false-belief tasks.

I turn to the first question first. According to Apperly and Butterfill’s (2009, p. 962) official definition, “one stands in the registering relation to an object and location if one encountered it at that location and if one has not since encountered it somewhere else.” So the notion of registration is defined in terms of the notion of encountering. An agent is further said to stand in the encountering relation to an object if the object stood in the agent’s field at a given instant and was not visually occluded from the agent’s line of sight (or otherwise blocked from the agent’s sensory processing) (Butterfill and Apperly, 2014, p. 614). They construe encountering and registration as “non-representational proxies for perception and belief” (ibid., p. 624). As they strongly emphasize, encountering is a non-aspectual relation between an agent, an object and a location. Given the definition of registration in terms of encountering, registration is expected to inherit its non-aspectuality (or relational character) from the non-aspectuality of the encountering relation. Representing an agent’s registration of an object at a location should be extensional (not intensional) to the same extent that

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12 On the two-systems model, minimal mindreaders can represent the contents of others’ registrations, but not the contents of others’ beliefs as such. It so happens that the contents of others’ registrations overlap with the contents of others’ beliefs about an object’s location as such. Minimal mindreaders lack therefore any means of tracking the contents of others’ beliefs about other topics than an object’s location. In particular, they are unable to track the contents of others’ false beliefs about object identity.
representing the agent’s encounter with that object is extensional.

Clearly, the condition of adequacy that is built into the two-systems model and that the notion of registration ought to satisfy is that representing the contents of others’ registrations (which is achieved by the early-developing efficient system) should be cognitively easier and less demanding than representing the contents of others’ beliefs (which can only be achieved by the later-developing more flexible system). The very fact that the contents of others’ registrations are non-aspectual and that the representations of others’ registrations are purely extensional is further evidence that representing the contents of others’ registrations fits this condition.

But consider what the official definition implies: an agent could not stand in the registration relation to an object and a location at time $t$ unless the agent stood in the encountering relation to that object at some earlier time $t-1$ and she did not encounter the same object at any other location in the interval between $t-1$ and $t$. This entails in turn that one could only represent an agent’s registration of an object at a location at $t$ if (i) one could represent the agent’s encountering the object at the same location at $t-1$ and (ii) one could further represent the fact that the agent failed to encounter the same object at any other location in the interval between $t-1$ and $t$. Condition (ii) is important because it specifies the extent to which representing registration goes beyond representing encounter. But if so, then only if one could represent the negation of the encountering relation and also universally quantify over places could one represent another’s registration of an object at a location. So the question arises: to what extent does registration satisfy the condition of adequacy according to which representing others’ registrations should be significantly less demanding than representing others’ beliefs?

Several critics (including two referees for this paper) have suggested two lines of defense on behalf of the two-systems model, the first of which is that it is one thing to assume
that an agent stands in the registration relation to an object at a location if she stood in the encountering relation with this object at the same location at an earlier time and did not encounter the object at a different location after this time. It is quite another thing to further claim, as I do, that one could not represent the agent’s registration relation with an object and a location unless one could represent both the fact that the agent earlier stood in the encountering relation with the same object at an earlier time at the same location and the fact that the agent did not encounter this object elsewhere at a later time. For example, these critics point out that from the fact that content externalists claim that an individual could not think about water unless she stood in the causal relation to water, it does not follow that content externalists are thereby committed to the view that an individual could not think about water unless she could also represent the causal relation between water and herself. Similarly many epistemologists assume that the mere lack of relevant alternatives to the truth of proposition $p$ for an agent is a sufficient condition for the agent to know proposition $p$. It is not further necessary that the agent be able to represent the lack of relevant alternatives for her to know proposition $p$. I do agree that it is not necessary for an agent to stand in the registration relation to an object and a location at a time that she knows (or represents) the fact that she earlier stood in the encountering relation to the same object and location and that she did not encounter it elsewhere at some later time. But I do maintain that given the two-systems model definition of registration, a minimal mindreader could not represent the fact that an agent stands in the registration relation to an object and a location unless she could also represent the fact that she earlier encountered the same object at the same location and failed to encounter it elsewhere since then.

A second line of defense suggested by a referee for this paper is that if the ability to represent the contents of others’ registrations does require, as I argue, the ability to use negation (of the encountering relation) and universal quantification (over places), then this
may well be consistent with the purported informational encapsulation of the early-developing system. Perhaps this is correct. If so, then advocates of the two-systems model can happily assume that the early-developing system is informationally encapsulated and also requires the ability to use negation and universal quantification. But it is worth, I think, to point out in this context that in her impressive study on concepts, Carey (2009) argues that the ability to use negation and universal quantification rests on language acquisition.

Secondly, I now want to cast doubt on the claim that the two-systems model can resolve the puzzle of the developmental discrepant findings: why do 3-year-olds fail explicit change-of-location false-belief tasks if findings based on implicit tasks show that preverbal infants expect agents to act in accordance with the contents of their true and false beliefs. Now the typical structure of the mistaken agent’s instrumental action in implicit change-of-location false-belief tasks is exactly the same as the structure of the mistaken agent’s instrumental action in explicit change-of-location false-belief tasks (e.g. the Sally-Anne task). In either implicit or explicit tasks, a mistaken agent places her toy in one of a pair of opaque containers and in her absence the toy’s location is switched. But, as advocates of the two-systems model have claimed, the ability to represent true and false registrations is sufficient to account for such findings as Onishi and Baillargeon (2005), which “could be explained on the hypothesis that [infants] are tracking registration as a cause of action” (Butterfill and Apperly, 2014, p. 620).

The fact that the structure of a mistaken agent’s instrumental action is the same in both implicit and explicit change-of-location false-belief tasks is fundamental for appraising the question whether the two-systems model can resolve the developmental puzzle. If

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14 “Registration also can be understood as determining which location an individual will direct their actions to when attempting to act on that object. This more sophisticated understanding (which requires the notion of an unsuccessful action) enables one to predict actions on the basis of incorrect registrations and so approximate belief reasoning to such a great extent as to pass some false-belief tasks (e.g., Onishi & Baillargeon, 2005)” (Apperly and Butterfill, 2009, pp. 962-963).
representing the content of another’s registration is sufficient to account for infants’ responses in implicit change-of-location false-belief tasks and if the false-belief scenario is the same whether the task is explicit or implicit, then it should also be sufficient for securing participants’ understanding of the content of the mistaken agent’s false belief in explicit change-of-location false-belief tasks. If so, then the early-developing efficient system should be sufficient for enabling participants to understand the content of the mistaken agent’s epistemic state in either implicit or explicit tasks. Presumably, the only difference between an implicit and an explicit change-of-location false-belief task is that in the latter only, not in the former, participants are also directly asked an explicit question. If so, then presumably the advocate of the two-systems model should argue that success in explicit, but not in implicit, change-of-location false-belief tasks further requires the later-developing flexible system necessary for reading the experimenter’s mind and recognizing her communicative intention. But if so, then advocates of the two-systems model seem committed to the following dilemma, neither horn of which should be very attractive to them. One option is that the early-developing and the later-developing systems of mindreading cooperate and speak to each other in order to explain success in explicit change-of-location false-belief tasks: the early-developing system is sufficient for tracking the content of the mistaken agent’s false belief and the later-developing system is required for attributing a communicative intention to the experimenter. But this seems to contradict the fundamental assumptions made by advocates of the two-systems model that the two systems are separate, do not speak to each other and that the early-developing system persists thought adulthood alongside the later-developing system. The other option is that while the early-developing system is sufficient to resolve implicit change-of-location false-belief tasks, the later-developing system alone is involved in resolving explicit change-of-location false-belief tasks. In which case, the early-developing system must be inhibited either by the later-developing system itself or by some higher-level
executive system. This option is also problematic for advocates of the two-systems model because the early-developing system is taken to be automatic and it is far from obvious how an automatic system could be inhibited, if at all.

So far, I have assumed, along with advocates of the two-systems model, that representing the contents of others’ registrations is indeed sufficient for explaining the infants’ data based on implicit change-of-location false-belief tasks. Now, I want thirdly to cast doubt on this assumption. The problem this time is that registration is officially defined as a ternary unstructured relation between an agent, a toy and a location: (R<agent, toy, location>). On this official unstructured relational construal, an agent can register the presence of a toy at a location. Now consider the experimental design of Onishi and Baillargeon’s (2005) test trials: each of the pair of visible green and yellow opaque boxes is at a location. However, what matters to the agent is the invisible toy, which happens to be within (or inside) one of the pair of boxes (e.g. the green box), not the pair of colored visible boxes, each of which is at a location. Unless the advocates of the two-systems model were to endorse one of the non-mentalistic accounts of such implicit change-of-location false-belief tasks along either Perner and Ruffman’s (2005) associationist or Heyes’s (2014) sub-mentalizing proposal, advocates of the two-systems model face the following dilemma: either registration is an unstructured ternary relation or it is not. If it is, then representing the content of the agent’s registration is unlikely to be sufficient to enable infants to represent the content of the agent’s true or false epistemic state about the location of her toy in the test trials of Onishi and Baillargeon’s study. In the belief-induction trials, the agent last saw her toy being placed into one of the pair of boxes. However, in the test trials, the toy is invisible; each of the pair of boxes is at a location and one of the pair of boxes contains the invisible toy. So the invisible toy is inside or within one of the two boxes. In order to make sense of the agent’s action of reaching into one of the boxes in the test trials, the infants must represent the fact that toy is
inside one of the pair of boxes. If registration is unstructured, then infants may represent the agent’s registration of the box that contains the toy as being at its location, but not the toy as being inside the box (which is at its location). If registration is not unstructured, then infants may represent the agent’s registration of the toy as being inside the box which is at its location. But then it is likely that the content of the agent’s registration is going to suspiciously look propositional, e.g. R<agent, within<toy, green box>>, in which relations are nested within one another. If so, then the gap between the contents of respectively others’ registrations and others’ beliefs about an object’s location becomes evanescent.

5. Is aspectuality a signature limit of the early-developing system?

One of the most interesting empirical claims made by advocates of the two-systems model is that representing the *aspectuality* of genuine beliefs (as displayed e.g. by the intensionality of belief reports on a *de dicto* reading) is beyond the limits of the early-developing efficient system. It is only within the capacities of the later-developing flexible system: representing the aspectuality of genuine beliefs should be a “signature limit” of the early-developing system that could be displayed by adults as well as preverbal infants. However, this claim turns out to be disconfirmed by the empirical evidence.

As I earlier noticed, advocates of the two-systems model draw a sharp dichotomy between the cognitive challenges raised by change-of-location false-belief tasks and false-belief tasks about object-identity. However, as I also earlier noticed, there seems to be a continuum from change-of-location to object-identity tasks, ranging over unexpected-contents tasks. Registration is supposed to enable minimal mindreaders to track the contents of others’ false beliefs about an object’s location in implicit tasks. Full-blown mindreading is required for representing the contents of others’ false beliefs about object-identity as such. However, the evidence shows that the developmental puzzle also arises for research based on object-
Much evidence shows that explicit object-identity false-belief tasks are more challenging for young children than explicit change-of-location false-belief tasks. For example, in studies by Apperly and Robinson (1998; 2003), children between 4- and 6-years of age, who succeed on explicit change-of-location false-belief tasks, were shown two objects, one with a single aspect, the other one with two aspects: one was e.g. an eraser and the other was an eraser that was also a die. The children were introduced to a puppet who only knew of the object with a dual nature that it was a die. The agent was present when the eraser with a single aspect was placed into one opaque container and the object with a dual nature was placed in the other opaque container. When children were asked to predict in which of the two containers the agent was likely to look for an eraser, they were at chance and selected at random between the locations of the two objects (cf. Rakoczy et al., 2015 and Perner et al., 2015 for discussion).

However, in a recent study, Rakoczy et al. (2015) suitably modified the above task by introducing a single object with a dual nature, which was both a die and an eraser. In the false-belief condition, only the children, not the protagonist, were informed of its dual nature; the protagonist knew of the object only as an eraser. The object was placed into one of two opaque containers under its eraser aspect in the presence of both the children and the protagonist. The children were reminded, in the protagonist’s absence, of the dual nature of the eraser. Finally, in the presence of both the children and the protagonist, the object was moved under its die aspect from one container to the other. The children, who were the same age as in Apperly and Robinson’s studies, were asked where the protagonist would look for the eraser. Most children correctly pointed to the first container. In the true-belief condition, in which the agent was aware of the dual nature of eraser-die, most children correctly pointed
to the second container in response to the same question.

Furthermore, there are at least two important studies that provide evidence that preverbal infants can represent the content of an agent’s false belief about object-identity, one of which involves false beliefs about two indistinguishable objects, and the other of which involves false beliefs about a single object with two distinct aspects. In the familiarization trials of Scott and Baillargeon’s (2009) study, 18-month-olds see an agent who is being presented with two penguins: a disassembled two-piece penguin and a one-piece penguin. Then they see the agent place her key into the two-piece penguin and assemble it into what now looks indistinguishable from the one-piece penguin. In the test trials of the false-belief condition, while the agent is absent, they see someone else place the one-piece penguin into an opaque box, assemble the two-piece penguin and place it into a transparent box. So what is in the transparent box (the assembled two-piece penguin) looks indistinguishable from the one-piece penguin. (In the true-belief condition, the agent is present while another person places the one-piece penguin into an opaque box, assembles the two-piece penguin and places it into a transparent box.) Then the agent comes in, sees both boxes and reaches either for the transparent box or for the opaque box. In the false-belief condition (but neither in the true-belief condition nor in the ignorance condition), infants looked reliably longer when the agent reached for the transparent than the opaque box providing thereby behavioral evidence that they expected the agent to falsely believe that the visible penguin in the transparent box was the one-piece penguin and that the two-piece penguin should therefore be in the opaque box.

In a further study by Buttelmann et al. (2015), 18-month-olds were made aware that each of a set of target toys had a deceptive aspect: for example, a sponge that looked like a rock. For each of the set of target toys, the infants were provided with pairs of test objects, each member of which resembled either aspect of the target toys. Infants saw an agent who either knew about the two aspects of the target toys or did not, and who wanted to reach one
of them but failed to grasp it. Infants were instructed to help the agent achieve her goal by giving her, not the very target object that the agent was unsuccessfully trying to grasp, but instead one of the pair of duplicate objects that were available to them. The infants reliably gave the agent the duplicate object that resembled the target under its aspect known to the agent, only in the false-belief condition (when the agent was not aware of the target’s two aspects), not in the true-belief condition (when the agent was aware of the target’s two aspects). This pair of studies strongly suggests that 18-month-olds are able to ascribe to others false beliefs about the identity of either two indistinguishable objects or two distinct aspects of a single object. Strictly speaking, only tasks involving an agent’s false belief about a single object with two distinct aspects can be said to test participants’ understanding of the aspectuality of beliefs. If so, then the penguin study by Scott and Baillargeon, which involves an agent’s false belief about two indistinguishable penguins, not a single object with two aspects, does not strictly speaking probe participants’ understanding of the aspectuality of beliefs. However, understanding an agent’s false belief about respectively two indistinguishable objects and a single object with two distinct aspects seem to require very similar sorts of cognitive resources.

In contradistinction to the findings by Buttelmann et al. (2015), Rakoczy (2015) reports the findings of a study investigating toddlers’ understanding of aspectuality on the basis of the helping paradigm first used by Buttelmann et al. (2009) in the context of change-of-location false-belief tasks (cf. section 3). In this study, a toy with two aspects was placed in one of two boxes under one of its two aspects (aspect A) in the presence of both the agent and two-year-olds. But only the 2-year-olds, not the agent, were aware of the toy’s other aspect (aspect B). The toy was subsequently moved from the first to the second box under its B aspect in the presence of both the agent and the infants. Since the agent was unaware of the toy’s B aspect, she must have falsely believed that there were two objects, one in each box.
Finally the agent unsuccessfully tried to open the first box seemingly trying to retrieve the toy under its A aspect. The infants were invited to help the mistaken agent. Contrary to the findings reported by Buttelmann et al. (2009), Rakoczy and colleagues found that 2-year-old did not reliably help the mistaken agent by opening the second box that contained the single object with two aspects (no more so than in the true-belief condition). Rakoczy (2015) concludes that this finding vindicates the two-systems model’s prediction that understanding the aspectuality of belief (or passing object-identity false-belief tasks) is beyond the limitations of the minimal mindreading system. This conclusion, however, is not inevitable. In order to efficiently help the mistaken agent find her toy, it is necessary that infants understand that the agent falsely believes that there are two toys (not one), one in the first box and another in the second box. But it is not sufficient. They could only efficiently help the mistaken agent find her toy by opening the second box if they further felt confident that the agent’s desire to find her toy, which she only knows under its A aspect, would be fulfilled upon discovering the toy under its B aspect under which its was moved from the first to the second box. Lack of confidence about the fulfillment of the agent’s desire might prevent 2-year-olds from opening the second box. If so, then it is not clear that this last finding offers support to the two-systems model.

In light of the two previous studies then, advocates of the two-systems model face the following dilemma, one horn of which is that the later-developing system (which is responsible for the representation of the contents of others’ false beliefs about object-identity) is already present in 18-month-olds. The other horn of the dilemma is that the representation of the content of another’s false belief about object-identity is not a signature limit of the early-developing system.

Finally, in a pair of studies, Low and Watts (2013) and Low et al. (2015) have tried to offer direct support for the claim that representing the contents of another’s belief about
object-identity is within the purview of full-blown mindreading, but falls beyond the resources of minimal mindreading. In the familiarization trials of a study by Low and Watts (2013), participants were provided with evidence that an agent had a preference for blue things over red things, each of which were standing in an opaque box either on his right or on his left. They also learnt that a light signal served as a cue that the agent was about to reach and grasp the blue toy, which he liked more than the red toy. In a subsequent sequence of three distinct events composing the test trial, participants first saw the agent watch while a red puppet moved from the box on the left to the box on the right. Secondly, only participants, not the agent, were able to see that the red puppet, which had just moved from left to right, was red on one side and blue on the other side. Thirdly, they saw the agent watch again while the puppet moved back to its original position under its blue side. Since participants knew that the puppet had two colors, they could now attribute to the agent the mistaken belief that there were two puppets (not one): a blue puppet in the box on the right and a red puppet in the box on the left.

In their study, Low and Watts tested false-belief understanding about object-identity in 3-year-olds, 4-year-olds and adults using two different measures: in the explicit task, they asked participants to predict which box the agent will look into. In the implicit task, they coded the location of participants’ anticipatory gaze just before the agent acted. They found that only 25% of the adults (and very few of the children) correctly gazed at the empty box. But they also found that 70% of the adults and 50% of the 4-year-olds, who failed to show accurate anticipatory looking, were able to answer the explicit prediction question. Assuming further that anticipatory gaze probes the early-developing efficient system, but the explicit prediction question probes the later-developing flexible system, Low and Watts concluded that their findings corroborate the two-systems model’s claim that false-belief understanding about object-identity is a signature-limit of the early-developing system of mindreading.
There are, however, at least two reasons for caution about this conclusion. First of all, the experiment did not merely test participants’ ability to represent the content of another’s false belief about a puppet’s identity. They also tested participants’ ability to revise the content of their own belief that the puppet currently in the box on the right is red all over into the new belief that it is red on one side and blue on the other side. As a result of revising their own beliefs, participants were also forced to retrospectively revise the content of the belief first ascribed to the agent that the puppet in the right box is red all over. Thus, when participants see the blue-colored puppet move from the right to the left box, they must ascribe to the agent the false belief that there are two puppets: a red one in the left box and a blue one in the right box. In a nutshell, the experiment does not merely test participants’ ability to track the content of an agent’s false belief about an object’s identity but also their ability to revise or update their own belief about the puppet’s colors (cf. Carruthers, 2015; Jacob, 2013). Secondly, in the explicit prediction task, participants were under no time constraint. But anticipatory gaze was measured only 1,750-ms after the light signal that served as a cue that the agent was about to act. Arguably, in such a short temporal interval, participants did not have enough time to compute the content of the agent’s false belief. The upshot is that this study does not support the two-systems claim that false-belief understanding about object-identity is a signature limit of the early-developing system that can only be overcome by the later-developing system.\(^{15}\)

6. The cognitive trade-off between flexibility and efficiency

As Apperly (2013, pp. 73-74) puts it, one of the central claims on behalf of the separation between two systems for mindreading is that “there is a tension between the requirement that mindreading be extremely flexible on the one hand, and fast and highly efficient on the other.

\(^{15}\) Similar problems affect another intriguing study by Low et al. (2014), in which participants can only figure out the content of a protagonist’s false belief if they perform a taxing mental rotation. Cf. Jacob (2013 ; 2014) and Carruthers (2015).
Such characteristics tend not to co-occur in cognitive systems, because the very characteristics that make a cognitive process flexible—such as unrestricted access to the knowledge of the system—are the same characteristics that make cognitive processes slow and effortful. Instead, flexibility and efficiency tend to be traded against one another.” In short, the bifurcation between minimal and full-blown mindreading systems rests to a large extent on the fundamental assumption that minimal mindreading is efficient because it is automatic (i.e. informationally encapsulated in Fodor’s (1983) sense, cf. Figure 1). By contrast, full-blown mindreading is taken to be effortful, inefficient, flexible and non-encapsulated (in Fodor’s sense). As Butterfill and Apperly (2014, p. 608) have put it, a process is automatic if it occurs whether or not it is relevant to participants’ motives and goals (Butterfill, and Apperly, 2014, p. 608; cf. Carruthers, 2015; 2016). In a nutshell, a process is automatic only if its execution is independent from an agent’s conscious goals or motivations and her background knowledge. In other words, a process is automatic if it is hard (if not impossible) to inhibit it.\textsuperscript{16}

Putative evidence that human adults can achieve some mindreading tasks automatically in the relevant sense has been provided by several recent studies. For example, Kovacs et al. (2010) reported that adults, whose psychophysical task was to press a button as fast as possible as soon as they detected a ball behind an occluder, were faster when they expected the ball to be there rather than when neither they nor another agent (a blue smurf) expected it to be there. Kovacs and colleagues also found that participants were faster when they did not expect the ball to be there, but the blue smurf wrongly expected it to be there. Here it seems as if adults did compute the content of the blue smurf’s false belief about the ball’s location in spite of its irrelevance to their psychophysical task.\textsuperscript{17} (In further work,

\textsuperscript{16} As two referees for this chapter note, it is an open question (which I leave entirely open) whether automaticity and speed always go together.

\textsuperscript{17} Van der Wel et al. (2014) further report that when participants reach toward a target object, the trajectory of their reaching actions can also be modulated by the content of another’s false belief.
Kovacs et al., 2014 and Kovacs, 2016 have construed their earlier findings in terms of spontaneous rather than strictly automatic processes, where a spontaneous process is one not triggered by external instructions such as an experimenter’s request.

By contrast, Apperly et al. (2006) and Back and Apperly (2010) report putative evidence that the representation of the contents of others’ false beliefs is effortful and not automatic. In these studies, participants see a male agent hide a ball under one or another cup either in the presence or the absence of a female agent. Participants are explicitly instructed to track the location of the ball. Occasionally they are unexpectedly probed about their representation of the content of the female agent’s true or false belief (about the ball’s location). Apperly et al. (2006) and Back and Apperly (2010) found that participants’ reports about the female agent’s beliefs are slower than their reports about the ball’s location. This temporal difference vanishes if they are explicitly instructed instead to keep track of the female agent’s beliefs. This evidence is compatible with the non-automaticity of mindreading. However, Cohen and German (2009) modified the above experimental design by significantly shortening the temporal interval between the event whereby the female agent formed her (true or false) belief and the event whereby participants were probed for reporting their representation of the agent’s belief. Under such a modification, the mindreading task is less taxing for participants’ working memory. Cohen and German found that participants’ responses about the agent’s beliefs were just as fast as their responses about the location of the ball. Thus, whether the process whereby adults represent the contents of others’ true and false beliefs is automatic or not is an open question.

In several further studies, Apperly and colleagues have systematically investigated some of the contrasts between Level-1 and Level-2 visual perspective-taking tasks (cf. Flavell et al., 1981): in Level-1 visual perspective-taking tasks, participants are requested to understand that two agents may not see the same things because some which are visible to
one may be occluded to the other. For example, in a “dot-perspective” study of Level-1 visual perspective-taking by Samson et al. (2010), adults were asked how many dots they could see in a scene displaying a room with three walls and an avatar facing one of the walls. Samson et al. (2010) found the following altercentric effect: participants’ answers were faster and more accurate when they could see the same number of dots as the avatar rather than when they were not. This suggests that participants automatically computed the avatar’s Level-1 visual perspective despite the fact that it was not relevant to answering the question of how many dots they could see.18

In Level-2 visual perspective-taking tasks, participants are requested to understand that two agents may see one and the same thing differently or under distinct aspects. (To some extent, Level-2 visual perspective tasks probe participants’ understanding of the aspectuality of others’ epistemic visual perceptual states.) For example, in Surtees et al.’s (2012) “numeral-perspective” study involving Level-2 visual perspective-taking, participants saw an avatar facing them, sitting at a table on top of which a numeral was displayed. On consistent trials, participants and the avatar could see the numeral displayed on the table in the same way (e.g. ‘8’). On inconsistent trials, participants and the avatar could not see the numeral displayed on the table in the same way (e.g. ‘6’). Surtees et al. (2012) did not find any altercentric effect: when asked what they could see, participants were not slower nor less accurate in the inconsistent than in the consistent trials. This suggests that participants did not automatically compute the avatar’s Level-2 visual perspective.

Thus, there is some empirical support for the joint claims that the automatic execution of Level-1 visual perspective-taking tasks by human adults directly reflects the efficiency and the encapsulation of minimal mindreading, but the effortful execution of Level-2 visual

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18 Santebastian et al. (2014) reproduce the altercentric effects of the “dot-perspective” by replacing the avatar with an arrow. They argue that this is evidence that the dot-perspective task can be achieved by domain-general processes of sub-mentalizing. However, arrows may be interpreted by participants as symbols used by (and therefore as proxies for) agents with beliefs and desires for the purpose of providing information.
perspective-taking tasks by human adults directly reflects the distinctive flexibility and non-encapsulation of full-blown mindreading. However, both claims have been recently subjected to interesting criticisms by advocates of one-system approaches to mindreading (in particular, Carruthers, 2015; 2016 and Westra, 2016b).

I start with the claim that Level-2 visual perspective-taking tasks require effortful cognitive resources that are intrinsic to the mindreading capacities. First of all, as Carruthers (2015, 2016) has argued, in order to judge whether the avatar sees a stimulus as “6” or “9” (in Surtees et al.’s (2012) Level-2 perspective taking task), when participants themselves see it as “6,” they need to take their own mental image of the stimulus and mentally rotate it until it matches the avatar’s spatial position and orientation. This mental rotation requires executive working memory resources necessary to sustain and manipulate one’s visual representation. But the process of mental rotation itself is part of mental visual imagery, not mindreading. If so, then Level-2 visual perspective-taking tasks are effortful, not because mindreading is effortful, but because mental rotation is.

Secondly, as Carruthers (2015; 2016) has further argued, in the “numeral-perspective” study by Surtees et al. (2012), participants might lack sufficient motivation for representing a mere avatar’s visual perspective onto a numeral. If so, then they might not feel the urge to engage their working memory resources necessary for performing the task of mentally rotating their own visual image of the numeral in order that it matches the avatar’s spatial orientation. This would explain the absence of altercentric effects (which are taken to be a signature of Level-1 visual perspective-taking by Apperly and colleagues).

To a large extent, Carruthers’ motivational diagnosis is corroborated by a recent study by Elekes et al. (2016), who used a modified version of Surtees et al.’s (2012) numeral-perspective task. All participants perform a number-verification task in which they check whether a numeral which they can see on a computer screen lying flat in front of them does or
not represent the same number as a number word heard from an audio-recording. Elekes and colleagues compared three conditions: in the Individual (or baseline) condition, participants perform the number-verification task alone. In a pair of Joint conditions, participants face a live partner while they perform the number-verification task. In the Joint perspective-dependent condition, they are informed that their partner is completing the very same task (and therefore shares their goal, even if they are not involved in performing a joint action). In the Joint non-perspective-dependent condition, they are told that their partner is completing a different task, e.g. judging whether the color of the numeral being presently displayed on their computer screen is the same as the color of the numeral previously displayed on their computer screen. Elekes and colleagues report an altercentric effect (i.e. participants were slowed down) in the Joint condition relative to the Individual condition, but only if they knew or believed that their partner shared their own goal and their partner’s response would diverge from their own on the basis of Level-2 visual perspective-taking (e.g. ‘6’ or ‘9’, not ‘0’ or ‘8’). As Westra (2016b) notes, these findings show that “Level-2 perspective-taking can, at times, be fast and efficient, provided that subjects are provided with the right background knowledge and are sufficiently motivated. This contradicts the claim that Level-2 perspective-taking is a slow and effortful process.”

I now turn to the claims that Level-1 visual perspective-taking tasks can be automatically executed by human adults and that this automaticity directly reflects the efficiency and the encapsulation of minimal mindreading. In Level-1 visual perspective-taking tasks, participants must determine what another agent is seeing — what she can and cannot see. Closely related tasks have been investigated within the so-called “gaze-cueing” paradigm, which rests on participants’ ability to determine where another is looking. In typical gaze-cueing studies, participants see a human face in the center of a screen whose eyes

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19 Surtees et al. (2016) report a very similar finding based on a set up in which participants take turns with a partner, instead of performing the same task simultaneously.
are looking straight at them but who can shift her gaze sideways to her left or to her right. Their task is to detect a target object that can appear on either side of the face in front of them. In congruent trials, the target object appears on the side towards which the face has just shifted her gaze. In incongruent trials, the target object appears on the alternative side. The general finding is that participants are cued by the individual’s gaze shift: they are slower to detect the target object in the incongruent than in the congruent trials.

As insightfully noticed by Westra (2016b), several experiments show that participants’ responses in the gaze-cueing paradigm are modulated by their background knowledge. For example, in a study by Teufel et al. (2010), participants first experienced either opaque or transparent goggles that looked exactly the same from the outside. In the gaze-cueing task, they all watched an agent whose face was looking straight at them, but who was wearing goggles. Only participants who had experienced transparent (not opaque) goggles were cued by the agent’s head-movements. In other words, if participants thought that the agent could not see, then his head-movements failed to cue them. Other experiments by Ristic and Kingstone (2005) show that when participants are presented with an ambiguous stimulus that can be construed as either a pair of eyes or a pair of wheels, they are only cued by what they take to be eyes, not wheels. Other studies have also shown gaze-cueing to be modulated by participants’ knowledge of whether the agent whose face they see is an in- or an out-group member, whether they know his or her age, race, social status, and how threatening they perceive him or her to be. For example, if an agent is a low-status member of participants’ in-group, then his or her face is less likely to gaze-cue participants than if he or she is a high-status member of participants’ in-group or a threatening member of participants’ out-group (cf. Chen and Zhao 2015).

It is plausible that if representing what an agent sees (Level-1 visual perspective-taking) is automatic, then so is representing where an agent is looking (gaze-cueing).
Conversely it is equally plausible that if representing where an agent is looking is *not* automatic, then *neither* is representing what an agent is seeing. There is evidence that representing where an agent is looking is neither automatic not encapsulated from participants’ background knowledge. This evidence undermines the claim that representing what an agent sees (Level-1 visual perspective-taking) is always automatic and encapsulated from participants’ background knowledge. In short, what makes Level-2 visual perspective-taking tasks challenging may reflect demands of mental rotation, not mindreading per se.

There is also evidence that enhancing participants’ motivation may improve their performance in Level-2 visual perspective-taking tasks. If the presence of altercentric effects is taken as evidence of automaticity, then the findings by Elekes et al. (2016) should be taken as evidence that Level 2 visual perspective-taking can be automatic. Conversely, these findings might also be taken to cast doubt on the claim that the presence of altercentric effects should be taken as evidence of automaticity. Finally, there is further evidence that the processes involved in Level-1 visual-perspective tasks are not always automatic, but may instead be modulated by participants’ background knowledge.

As Carruthers (2015) and Westra (2016b) have argued, while the processes underlying Level-1 visual perspective-taking tasks turn out not to be automatic in all cases, the processes underlying Level-2 visual perspective-taking tasks turn out to be less effortful and more *spontaneous* than predicted by the two-systems model.20 If so, then the contrast between Level-1 and Level-2 visual perspective-taking tasks cannot be mapped onto the distinction between *automatic* and *effortful* mindreading processes. Alternatively, one may draw a distinction between the spontaneous and the reflective usage of a single mindreading capacity. For example, children and adults alike have been shown to spontaneously ascribe to puppets and even to geometrical stimuli psychological states ranging from emotions to false beliefs.

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20 Although Butterfill and Apperly (2014, p. 608) acknowledge the distinction between automatic and spontaneous processes, they seem to miss its significance for their proposal.
Adults, if not young children, are further able to suspend their ascription on the reflective grounds that puppets and geometrical stimuli cannot have psychological states. As Carruthers (2015) argues, a process may be construed as spontaneous to the extent that it is triggered by participants’ endogenous (conscious or unconscious) goals, not exogenously triggered by another’s instructions. Furthermore, a process may more or less spontaneous: people may be spontaneously more motivated to read some minds than others, just as they may have more background knowledge about some minds than about others.

**Conclusions**

The two-systems model is a significant attempt at offering a middle-ground approach to mindreading that stands half way between a cultural constructivist approach to mindreading and its nativist alternative. It aims at both resolving the developmental puzzle and making sense of data that suggest that adults perform some mindreading tasks automatically. In this chapter, I have highlighted three main critical points: the two-systems model fails to offer a satisfactory resolution of the developmental puzzle. The current evidence so far fails to vindicate the claim that the aspectuality of beliefs is a signature limit of the minimal mindreading system. Nor does the contrast between Level-1 and Level-2 visual perspective-taking tasks support the sharp distinction between the automaticity of one minimal mindreading system and the flexibility of a distinct full-blown mindreading system. In short, this chapter supports the picture of a single mindreading system that can be used in ways that are more or less effortful, as a result of its interactions with other cognitive systems, such as working memory, executive control and pragmatic competence.21

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