By Marine Buon, Pierre Jacob, Elsa Loissel & Emmanuel Dupoux. Abstract: in situations where an agent unintentionally causes harm to a victim,

Continue readingA non-mentalistic cause-based heuristic in human social evaluations

By Florian Cova, Emmanuel Dupoux & Pierre Jacob. Abstract: Recent empirical and conceptual research has shown that moral considerations have an

Continue readingOn Doing Things Intentionally

By Frédérique de Vignemont & Pierre Jacob. Abstract: We offer an account of empathetic pain that preserves the distinctions among

Continue readingWhat Is It like to Feel Another’s Pain?

By Pierre Jacob. Abstract: This paper assesses the scope and limits of a widely influential model of goal-ascription by human infants:

Continue readingSharing and Ascribing Goals

By Pierre Jacob. Abstract: This paper assesses the so-called “direct-perception” model of empathy. This model draws much of its inspiration from the

Continue readingThe direct-perception model of empathy: a critique

By Pierre Jacob. Abstract: I pursue here three related aims. First, I criticise some of the metaphysical claims made on behalf

Continue readingThe scope and limits of enactive approaches to visual experience

By Pierre Jacob. Abstract: The tuning-fork model of human social cognition, based on the discovery of mirror neurons (MNs) in the ventral

Continue readingThe tuning-fork model of human social cognition: A critique

By Pierre Jacob. Abstract: According to an influential view, one function of mirror neurons (MNs), first discovered in the brain of

Continue readingWhat Do Mirror Neurons Contribute to Human Social Cognition?

By Emmanuel Dupoux & Pierre Jacob. Abstract: A new framework for the study of the human moral faculty is currently

Continue readingUniversal moral grammar: a critical appraisal

By Pierre Jacob. ABSTRACT: Alva Noë’s version of the enactive conception in Action in Perception is an important contribution to the study

Continue readingWhy Visual Experience is Likely to Resist Being Enacted